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The board of directors serves two functions in the organization:
monitoring and resource provision. Agency theory mainly
addresses the former, while resource dependence theory focuses
on the latter. However, these theories consistently assume that
board members are not only able but also consistently willing to
fulfill their roles. From a resource dependence perspective, this
means that board members are generally inclined to share their
resources (information, social and political connections, and
functional experience) with the CEO. We challenge this assumption
by postulating that in the context of dyadic conflict between
the CEO and board chair, these resources will not be accessible to
the CEO, hence the resource provision function of the board will be
interrupted. We, therefore, unpack the black box of the board
dynamics by merging resource dependence theory with conflict
literature to a) present an in-depth description of the CEO-board
chair conflict and b) its implications for the CEO (heightened
turnover intentions), the board (board cohesion and board’s
monitoring role), and the organization. Theoretical and practical
implications are discussed.
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agency theory (Boyd, Haynes, & Zona, 2011; Graham,
Kim, & Leary, 2020). However, the application of
agency theory provides a limited view of
the CEO-board chair relationship by suggesting that
the dyadic parties have conflicting interests and lack
mutual trust (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Koskinen &
Lämsä, 2017). From this perspective, the CEO is seen
as an economic agent who acts opportunistically and
is motivated by high rewards at the expense
of shareholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989).
On the other hand, the board chair is expected to
apply an appropriate level of control to curb
the CEO’s opportunistic behavior. In the dyadic
CEO-board chair relationship, agency theory neither
acknowledges that the roles and tasks of each party
may be interlinked (Roberts & Dowling, 2002) nor

1. INTRODUCTION
While the working relationship between the CEO and
board chair has been acknowledged both in
theoretical literature (Robert & Stiles, 1999;
Sundaramurthy, & Lewis, 2003) and through
empirical studies as an important mechanism for
effective governance and a key element in Board
performance (Ng & De Cock, 2002), most studies fall
short of providing in-depth analysis of this dyadic
relationship. The relationship between the CEO and
chair of the board sets the leadership tone for
the whole board and sends signals to the wider
organization (Robert & Stiles, 1999). In prior
literature, the CEO-board chair relationship was
predominantly investigated from the viewpoint of
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considers that the CEO may be motivated by other
factors such as self-fulfillment, achievement of
results, and challenging work (Kulla, 2011).
In contrast, resource dependence theory
suggests a resource provisioning role for the board
of directors in reducing environmental volatility and
uncertainty (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009).
Organizations seek to interact with the environment
to access and obtain the resources they need to face
environmental dynamism and ensure survival.
For their part, given their relevant expertise and
knowledge, board members provide helpful advice
and influence strategy in achieving organizational
objectives (Kor & Misangyi, 2008).
An underlying assumption of resource
dependence theory is that board members are
consistently willing to make their resources available
to the CEO in the form of advice, financing, and
social connections and work collaboratively toward
the achievement of organizational objectives
(Hillman et al., 2009). We challenge this salient but
under-researched assumption and extend corporate
governance
research
by integrating
conflict
literature (Rahim, 1983; Thomas, 1992) to examine
the context of CEO-board chair conflict. Although
the idea of CEO-board chair conflict has been
brought up in prior literature as it relates to board
dynamics (Veltrop, Bezemer, Nicholson, & Pugliese,
2021) and as it relates to board monitoring
(Heemskerk, Heemskerk, & Wats 2017), an in-depth
illustration of this phenomenon has not been
addressed yet in the corporate governance literature.
Further, unpacking this phenomenon is in alignment
with recent trends in research seeking to understand
the so-called ―black box‖ of CEO-board dynamics.
Additionally, the paper responds to calls in the
literature emphasizing the importance of both board
members and the CEO as human beings who may all
suffer from issues often found in teams or in regular
human interactions (Demb & Neubauer, 1992).
We address this research voids while
integrating resource dependence theory with conflict
theory to further improve our understanding of
the impact of resource dependence theory on
individual, team, and organizational outcomes
(Ozturk, 2021). The propositions we developed in
this study not solely focus on analyzing
the contingencies that generate certain conflict
handling techniques from the CEO’s side but also
explain the implications of dyadic CEO-board chair
conflict on individual-level outcomes (CEO turnover
intentions) and team and organizational outcomes
(board-level outcomes).
Accordingly, in this paper, we aim to answer
the following research questions:
RQ1: How does resource dependence theory
explain the CEO-board chair conflict dynamics?
RQ2: What are the implications of the CEOboard chair conflict for the CEO?
RQ3: What are the implications of this conflict
on board outcomes and board functioning?
In the next pages, we explain in Section 2
the characteristics of the CEO-board chair conflict,
followed by the implications of this dyadic conflict
on the CEO and board outcomes and functioning.
Next, a detailed description of the conflict handling
techniques of the CEO will be elaborated on through
the integration of the resource dependence theory.
In the discussion section (Section 3), we elaborate on

theoretical and practical implications, while
Section 4 concludes the study and presents
the study’s limitations and future directions.

2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
2.1. CEO-board chair conflict and its antecedents
Conflict is generally defined as the occurrence of
goal divergence or goal opposition between or
among parties (Korsgaard, Jeong, Mahony, & Pitariu,
2008). Research has presented the conflict as
a multidimensional construct (Korsgaard et al.,
2008). Past literature essentially differentiates
between two types of conflicts: cognitive conflicts
and affective conflicts. Cognitive conflicts are
task-oriented and stem from differences in
perspective or judgment on the best ways to achieve
task goals or outcomes. Outcomes of cognitive
conflicts are typically functional and favorable to
the organization as they contribute to higher quality
decisions that benefit the organization and its
members (Amason, 1996). Cognitive conflicts can
be
triggered
by
built-in
heterogeneity
or
confrontational interactions, which may result in
undermining harmony and commitment among
team members (Jehn, 1994). Research shows that
when conflict remains task-focused, it improves not
only decision quality but also team members’
commitment and satisfaction (Tjosvold, Dann, &
Wong, 1992). However, research also cautions that as
organizations stimulate cognitive conflict among
teams, this may inadvertently trigger affective
conflict (Amason, 1996), which arises when parties
involved become emotional, or when they focus on
personal differences. These types of conflicts are
typically dysfunctional. Moreover, affective conflicts
can lead to suspicion, distrust, and hostility among
team members, obstruct the exchange of
information between team members, and ultimately
result in poor decision making (De Dreu & Weingart,
2003; Moye & Langfred, 2004). In this paper, we
focus on negative conflicts in general, either in
the form of affective conflicts or cognitive conflicts
that result in the derailment of quality relationships
between the CEO and board chair.
However, why should we believe that conflicts
will arise between the CEO and the board’s chair?
We first argue that conflicts are a natural occurrence
when two or more parties interact. Posthuma (2013)
argues that there is a vast range of situations that
can motivate conflicts at work, noting that ―conflict
exists because two or more parties engage with each
other over their differences‖ (p. 139). We argue that
the board’s chair and the CEO are no exception to
this rule and that conflict between them is highly
probable. Second, we know from previous research
that conflicts by definition occur when the parties
involved are committed to goals that diverge or are
incompatible. For example, past research has
indicated that CEOs tend to be relatively averse to
risky strategic initiatives, while board members,
especially outside board members, are typically less
risk-averse regarding investments since they
represent shareholders, who can mitigate risk
through diversification of investment portfolios
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson,
2002). Although this may not be consistently true,
attitude to risk is one example of goal
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incompatibilities. In addition, the main assumption
of prominent theories such as agency theory is that
CEO and shareholder goals diverge and that this will
motivate conflict between the CEO and board chair
because the board cares mainly about shareholders’
interests while the CEO may act opportunistically in
pursuit of career goals and own interest. Indeed,
the nature of the monitoring role of the board is
further evidence that the goals of the CEO and
boards diverge. Thus, the goal incompatibilities
embedded in the nature of the relationship between
the CEO and board chair may instigate conflicts
between them. Interestingly, even if the CEO takes
strategic initiatives that are in the best interest of
the firm, the board may fulfill its monitoring
function effectively by suspecting the CEO’s
intentions and motivations.
While goal incompatibility does not have to be
actual for conflict to arise, it can be merely felt or
perceived to act as an antecedent of dyadic conflict
(Korsgaard et al., 2008). A CEO or a board’s chair can
perceive that a conflict is underway despite none
being present. Moreover, since CEOs and board
members work in high-stakes circumstances often
involving high ambiguity and high uncertainty
(Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997; Jacquart &
Antonakis, 2015), conflicts will naturally emerge as
a result of external pressures from the environment
and or perspective heterogeneity among board
members, who are typically heterogeneous in their
tenure, functional background, gender, type (outside
or inside), and interests. Despite its favorable effect
on creativity and decision quality, heterogeneity can
also act as an antecedent to conflict (Korsgaard
et al., 2008). Finally, research shows that conflicts
occur in ―mixed-motive relationships where persons
have both competitive and cooperative interests‖
(Tjosvold, 2006, p. 88). While the competitive
context creates conflict, the cooperative factor
motivates
conflict
resolution
behaviors.
The relationship between CEO and board chair is
representative of this state of affairs since both
dynamics co-exist in this dyad and, therefore,
supports the view that conflict between CEO and
board chair is inevitable.
Nevertheless, affective or task-related conflicts
that are dealt with inadequately may result in
negative sentiments between the parties involved
such as anger, frustration, hostility, and withdrawal
and negatively affect the relationship between them
(Amason, 1996). Drawing from this literature, we
expect that in cases of negative sentiments resulting
from conflicts, the interaction and the quality of
the relationship between the CEO and board chair
will be affected. Hence, the board’s chair will be less
likely to fulfill the role of a resource provider to
the CEO and the organization and share information,
external linkages, and other resources, including
legitimization of the CEO. Typically, information
sharing is instantly affected when negative conflicts
arise (Amason, 1996). Consequently, the CEO will be
unable to access the resources needed. According to
resource dependence theory, this difficulty in
resource attainment will affect an organization’s
adaptation to the external environment since
the theory postulates that CEOs need board
members to access resources to benefit the firm and
enable it to adapt to changes in the environment and
thus survive (Hillman et al., 2009). Hence, conflict

interrupts one of the major functions of the board
chair, namely resource provision.
Proposition 1: Dyadic conflict between CEO and
board chair disrupts the resource provision function
of the board.
What makes the situation even more
challenging for the CEO and the organization is that
this dyadic conflict is likely to transfer to other
board members, for two reasons: First, conflict is
contagious (Jehn, Rispens, Jonsen, & Greer, 2013).
In teams or groups, dyadic conflicts between group
members transfer to other team members through
a) coalition formation, when team members take
sides and form coalitions against other groups;
b) emotional contagion, when negative emotions
arising from conflicts affect other teams members
so that they become behaviorally involved in
the conflict; and c) threats to individual and team
outcomes
when
team
members
feel
that
the achievement of their personal and organizational
goals are threatened by the conflict. Second,
following the same understanding of the escalation
of dyadic conflict to intragroup conflict, Korsgaard
et al. (2008) argue that conflicts tend to escalate to
higher conflict levels. In their model, they show how
dyadic conflicts can rise to intragroup and even
intergroup conflicts. In the boardroom, this
translates to the escalation of the CEO-board chair
conflict with other board members, especially those
who are not members of the organization, resulting
in reduced willingness to share resources with
the CEO. Depending on the degree of conflict and
the importance of resources withheld, this situation
leaves
the
CEO
facing
the
organization’s
environment dynamism and change without
sufficient support from board members. In high
levels of conflicts and subsequent conflict
contagion, the board can become entirely obsolete
regarding the resource provision function. In turn,
the firm’s adaptation to the environment will mainly
stem from the organization’s ability rather than
from external resources usually facilitated by
the board. CEOs in turn will no longer depend on
the board for external resources but rather on their
own capabilities in obtaining external resources for
the firm’s adaptation to a changing environment and
for firm survival. The situation will be worsened if
the environment is highly dynamic; however,
the specific interaction between organization and
environment is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is important to recall that the board has
another function, namely monitoring. This raises
the question of the effect of the interruption to
the resource provision function on the monitoring
role. Implicitly, extant literature assumes that
the board should ideally maintain a balance between
both functions in terms of readiness and capability.
This does not imply that the board should offer both
functions equally, but rather that it should be ready
to provide both functions as needed depending on
the governance context and organizational needs.
When the resource provision function of the board is
interrupted, we should expect to see the board place
greater emphasis on the monitoring function in
order to justify its existence. If the board is not
performing either role, why would it exist at all?
For the board to perform its functions and
legitimize its existence, any interruption to resource
provision will result in heavier weight being placed
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on the monitoring function. As illustrated in
Figure 1, in ideal situations, both board functions
will be maintained. However, when circumstances
affect either function (resource provision or
monitoring function), heavier emphasis will be

placed on the other function so that the board ―has
something to do‖.
Proposition 2: Interruption
to
the
board’s
resource provision function is positively associated
with the board’s monitoring function.

Figure 1. Balance of board functions

Ideal situation (balance
maintained)

Monitoring

Resource provision function
interrupted

Resource provision

Resource provision
Monitoring

Monitoring
Monitoring function
interrupted

Resource provision

the negative affect with the organization, and if
the board chair’s replacement is not foreseen,
the CEO’s turnover intentions will be heightened.
At the personal level, this is considered a salient
outcome of this type of conflict. However, based on
prior literature, we argue that actual turnover will
take place if other voluntary turnover predictors are
factored in, such as ease of movement (March &
Simon, 1958). Using affect theory, we also argue that
the CEO may consider leaving as a result of
the adverse emotional effects of conflicts attributed
to the organization based on affect theory
presumptions hence:
Proposition 3: Dyadic conflict between CEO and
board chair is positively associated with the CEO’s
negative affect towards the organization.
Proposition 4: Consistent
dyadic
conflicts
between CEO and board chair is positively associated
with the CEO’s turnover intentions.

2.2. Consequences of CEO-board chair conflict
Individual-level, team-level, and organizational-level
outcomes are consequences associated with the
CEO-board chair conflict. Regarding individual-level
outcomes, affect theory suggests that employees
form both positive and negative affective ties to
the workplace based on affective experience with
others at work (Lawler, 2013). This formation of
affective ties to the workplace is especially
pronounced when the positive or negative feelings
arising from the interactions with others at work are
repeated. This repetition promotes and solidifies
the association of the positive or negative feelings
with the ―shared relational or group affiliations‖
(i.e., the workplace or organization or department
shared with the colleague triggering the positive or
negative feelings) (Lawler, 2013, p. 26). Drawing
from this theory, we expect that in the context of
consistent negative conflicts, the CEO will associate
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At the group level and as mentioned earlier,
the negative conflict between the CEO and board
chair is likely to transfer to other board members,
and consequently, coalitions will be formed. While
some members will support the chair’s attitude,
others will support the CEO’s perspective. Thus, we
argue that this conflict contagion and coalition
formation within the board will unfavorably affect
board cohesion. In alignment with a wide array of
research on group cohesiveness (Mudrack, 1989), we
define board cohesion as the extent to which board
members bond with one another as group members
and with the group as a whole. Mudrack (1989)
equates group cohesion with words such as we-ness,
attraction to the group, group spirit, affective bonds,
and bonds of interpersonal attraction. However, all
such dimensions diminish when board members
form coalitions, even if these coalitions are merely
psychological. In fact, research shows that a lack of
team or group cohesion is detrimental to group
performance and effectiveness (Beal, Cohen, Burke,
& McLendon, 2003). This adds to evidence that in
case of conflicts, the board will perform in
a suboptimal manner.
Proposition 5: Dyadic conflict between CEO and
board chair is negatively associated with board
cohesion.
When the board performs at suboptimal levels,
many organizational-level outcomes will be affected.
A stream of research links board functionality and
board
characteristics
to
organizational-level
outcomes. For example, drawing from the resource
dependence perspective as the main theoretical
underpinning of this paper, we expect that
dysfunctionality in the board will be associated
with
slower
organizational
adaptation
to
the environment, leading the organization to forgo
first-mover advantage. We know from extant
research on first-mover advantage theory that,
among
other
factors,
timely
response
to
environmental opportunities enables firms to earn
such advantages (Dobrev, 2013; Choudhary, 2020).
In addition, firms usually depend on their resources
as inputs to enable them to respond to market
opportunities and thus yield market and profit
advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).
Therefore, when the resource provision function of
the board or that of the board’s chair is interrupted,
the firm is likely to forgo first-mover advantage, for
two reasons: a) lack of external resources provided
by the board, and b) deprivation of resources that
could have facilitated the seizing of opportunities in
the market and in turn yield first-mover advantages.
This line of reasoning typically holds for firms
operating in environments characterized by the high
pace of both market and technology evolution
(Suárez & Lanzolla, 2007).
However, this is only one of the potential
organizational-level outcomes associated with
the board’s suboptimal performance. In general,
boards are influential in terms of firm-level
outcomes. Other organizational outcomes expected
to be affected are firm performance (Darmadi, 2011;
He & Huang, 2011; Uribe-Bohorquez, MartínezFerrero, & García-Sánchez, 2018; Aggarwal, Jindal, &
Seth, 2019), innovativeness (Balsmeier, Buchwald, &
Stiebale, 2014; Ain, Yuan, & Javaid, 2022),

internationalization strategies (Ellstrand et al., 2002;
Yildiz, Morgulis‐Yakushev, Holm, & Eriksson, 2021),
and alliance formations (Gulati & Westphal, 1999;
Kang & Zaheer, 2018), to name a few.

2.2.1. Degree of conflict, resource importance, and
conflict handling techniques
Previous research has persistently shown that
degree of conflict matters (Amason, 1996; Pondy,
1967). We sustain our focus on negative conflicts
and follow Tjosvold’s (2006) classification of
conflicts as the extent of competitiveness or
cooperation embedded in the conflict. The higher
the competitiveness between CEO and board chair,
the higher the degree of conflict, while the higher
the cooperativeness between CEO and board chair,
the lower the degree of conflict.
Figure 2. Degree of dyadic conflict
Competitiveness
High conflict degrees

Low conflict degrees
Cooperativeness

This brings us to the conflict handling
techniques that will be adopted when the CEO
conflicts with the board’s chair. We articulate
the CEO’s rather than the board chair’s perspective
because the board’s chair is typically more powerful,
having the authority to hire or fire the CEO. In this
sense, the board’s chair can be perceived as
the CEO’s boss.
In his seminal paper, Pondy (1967) mentioned
that ―to the extent that conflict is valued negatively,
minor
conflicts
generate
pressures
toward
resolution without altering the relationship, and
major conflicts generate pressures to alter the form
of the relationship or to dissolve it all together‖
(p. 312). We acknowledge this argument and extend
it by incorporating the conflict handling techniques
theory (Thomas & Kilmann, 1978) to describe
the conflict handling techniques that will be adopted
by the CEO based on the degree of the dyadic
conflict and the importance of resources withheld as
a consequence of the conflict.
The two dimensions of the conflict handling
taxonomy in Thomas (1992) describe such conflict
handling techniques. The higher the conflicthandling behavior is on the taxonomy, the more the
behavior shows care for the other party (Posthuma,
2013). The two factors deciding the conflict-handling
behavior by the CEO are degree of conflict and
importance of the resource.
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Figure 3. Conflict handling techniques from the CEO perspective
Degree of CEO dependence on resources withheld (portance)

Degree of conflict between CEO and board chair

High

Collaborate
(Win-Win)

Accommodate
(Lose-Win)

Compromise

Low

Contend
(Win-Lose)

High

Avoid
(Lose-Lose)

Low

As discussed above and as visualized in
Figure 2, degree of conflict depends on how
competitive or cooperative the dyad is. On the other
hand, importance of the resource is determined
by how rare and valuable the resource is.
The theoretical underpinnings underlying the choice
of these two criteria relate to the resource-based
view of the firm (Barney, 1991). According to Barney
(1991), a resource is considered a source of
competitive advantage when it is both rare and
valuable. We argue that if the board’s chair owns or
holds valuable and rare resources, the resource
is considered vital, and consequently, the CEO
will depend on it to partially reduce environmental
uncertainty and promote the firm’s survival, as
suggested by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). The two other criteria discussed
by
Barney
(1991),
namely
imitability
and
substitutability of the resource, are important for
the firm in sustaining its competitive advantage.
Hence, these two criteria are relevant to the longterm sustainability of the firm and also take
the temporal factor into consideration. To keep our
line of argument parsimonious, we hold temporal
factors constant, and thus will disregard these two
criteria as they are beyond the scope of this
discussion. Since a resource is considered important
when it is both rare and valuable, the CEO is also
highly dependent on the resource. When the
resource is neither valuable nor rare, it is considered
unimportant, and thus the CEO is less dependent on
it for the firm’s survival. A final assumption is that
the CEO is not opportunistic and acts in the interest
of the firm. This assumption aligns with
the assumptions of resource dependence theory, one
of the major theoretical underpinnings in this paper.
Given all these considerations, five conflicthandling styles are available to the CEO:
accommodation,
avoidance,
collaboration,
compromise, and contention. When the CEO is highly
dependent on rare and valuable resources from
the board chair and when the degree of conflict is

simultaneously high, the CEO will accommodate
the board’s chair. This is a highly cooperative
conflict-handling style, which stems from the need
for a resource that could potentially be withheld but
is necessary for the organization. This is a lose-win
situation from the CEO’s perspective since the CEO
is ready to lose for the sake of winning the resource
needed. An example is a situation where the CEO is
newly hired and needs the board to grant the new
CEO legitimacy so that efforts can be immediately
made to implement strategic moves. In this case, if
the board’s chair is highly competitive, the CEO
needs to give in so as not to lose legitimacy.
Proposition 6: When the degree of dyadic conflict
between CEO and board chair is high and
the resource needed is high in importance, the CEO is
more likely to accommodate.
When the degree of conflict is low, but
the resource is high in importance, both parties can
win, and the CEO will collaborate. Collaborating
means that the CEO will discuss the situation with
the board’s chair and show understanding so that
both parties achieve a satisfactory resolution. Such
collaboration between the CEO and the board chair
can yield beneficial outcomes for a firm. Extant
literature has shown that collaborative relationships
between the CEO and board members of a company
can positively influence firm outcomes such as
performance (Westphal, 1999). This can act as
an added incentive to engage in a collaborative
effort when the dyadic conflict level is low.
An example is a situation where the board’s chair
misunderstands some of the strategic decisions the
CEO wants to take without the latter losing trust in
the former. In such a case, the board’s chair is also
being collaborative as well but lacks understanding
of the situation. Result: both parties win.
Proposition 7: When the degree of dyadic conflict
between CEO and board chair is low and the resource
needed is high in importance, the CEO is more likely
to collaborate.
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When resources that could be withheld by
the board’s chair are of low importance since
the organization is not highly dependent on them
and when the degree of conflict is high, the CEO will
avoid the board’s chair. However, such a situation
can be very rare since the board’s chair is typically
an important stakeholder in the firm and of the CEO,
and thus the CEO is usually motivated to stay on
good terms with the board’s chair. However, if such
a situation arises, the CEO will be minimally
collaborative and inconsiderate of the board’s chair.
From a resource dependence perspective, one of
the core pillars that sustain the CEO-board
relationship is the valuable information and
resources the board can provide to the CEO (Boyd
et al., 2011). However, if the importance of such
resources or even their availability gets minimized,
that incentive for a CEO to engage with the board
may be diminished. A real-life example could be
a case where the board’s chair is about to retire,
the chair’s resources are of relatively low importance
to the organization, especially if the board’s chair is
simultaneously having a low-quality relationship
with the CEO. In such a case, the CEO can choose to
avoid it until the board’s chair replacement
takes place.
Proposition 8: When the degree of the dyadic
conflict is high and importance of the resource
needed is low, the CEO is more likely to avoid
the board’s chair.
In a different setting, when the resource
dependence is low and the degree of conflict is
concurrently low, the CEO will try to win at
the expense of the board’s chair. While this is again
a highly unlikely scenario, it may arise if the CEO
behaves arrogantly and perceives the board’s chair
as lacking the possession of important resources.
Hence, this situation is more likely to be
a perceptual rather than a realistic scenario. Extant
literature has shown that CEOs can be prone to
overconfidence
and
hubris,
with
firm-level
consequences (Park, Kim, Chang, Lee, & Sung, 2018;
Tang, Mack, & Chen, 2018). When the supply of
valuable resources and information, as discussed in
the resource dependence perspective (Boyd et al.,
2011) is minimized, we propose that the CEO may
entertain perceptions of greater power and thus
manifest competitive behaviors. Another example of
this type of situation may arise when the board’s
chair is about to retire and has no major conflict
with the CEO. In this scenario, the CEO is more likely
to be inconsiderate of the board’s chair in
the knowledge that the board’s chair will soon be
replaced. Therefore:
Proposition 9: When the degree of conflict is low
and resource dependence is low, the CEO is more
likely to contend.
Finally, we propose a halfway situation, when
the dependence of the organization on the resource
is of medium importance and when the degree of
conflict is neither high nor low. In this context, both
the CEO and the board’s chair will compromise. Both
parties will act collaboratively and will take
the opposing
party
into
consideration,
and
agreement on common ground will be highly
possible.
This
argument
also
complements
the stewardship theory, where the gains to be
made from cooperation is prioritized, over
opportunism (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997;

Krause, 2017). We propose that when the means and
incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior for
the CEO and board chair are reduced, a compromise
to find a solution that satisfies each party’s needs
would be prioritized. In addition, we argue that this
is the typical scenario that will arise between
the CEO and board chair when mutual trust is
present and both parties care about the well-being of
the organization.
Proposition 10: When the degree of conflict and
degree of resource dependence are both moderate,
the CEO is more likely to compromise.

3. DISCUSSION
Drawing from resource dependence theory and
conflict literature, this paper addresses a gap in
the literature by unpacking the ―black box‖ of
CEO-board chair conflict, including the dyadic
conflict itself, its antecedents, its consequences, and
its implications for the CEO, the board, and the firm.
Scholars studying resource dependence theoryrelated phenomena have recommended that future
studies employ a multi-theoretical perspective to
further understand the applicability of this theory
(Ozturk, 2021). Our study attempts to address this
call by combining the theoretical arguments of
resource dependence theory with affect theory to
provide a novel conceptual framework that focuses
on contexts of CEO-chair conflict. To the best of our
knowledge, our effort is the first to combine these
two theoretical streams in order to address
the corporate governance phenomenon.
Theoretically, in addition to contributing to
increased knowledge of board room dynamics as
they pertain to CEO-board chair conflict, this paper
challenges the assumption of many theories,
including resource dependence theory, that board
members will consistently act according to their
expected roles and will be consistently willing to
share resources and thus fulfill their resource
provision function. Instead, we argued that negative
conflicts will unfavorably affect this willingness as
well as the availability of resources facilitated by
the board’s chair and board members. The paper
also responds to both explicit and implicit calls in
the literature to view board team members and top
management teams in general as normal human
beings, to which the same rules of human behavior
apply (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007). The paper also contributes
the notion of board cohesion to the literature in the
hope that this will stimulate future discussions
among scholars in the pursuit of further
understanding and testing it and examining its
antecedents and consequences in different contexts
and settings. Additionally, the paper adopts
a descriptive approach to explain how CEOs will
react to different types of conflicts with the board,
especially when the board’s chair possesses
resources that in turn differ in degree of importance.
This description contributes salient insights into
how CEOs respond to these types of challenges and
can further stimulate research on this relatively
novel phenomenon in the literature. Finally,
the paper highlights a dependency relationship
between both functions of the board, in contrast to
extant assumptions in the literature that both
functions are independent. Thus, we argue that
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a decrease in one of the functions leads to
an increase in the other since the board will seek to
legitimize its existence when one of the functions is
interrupted by focusing on its other role.
Practically,
this
paper
highlights
the importance of a collaborative relationship
between the CEO and board chair and points out to
salient implications of a suboptimal relationship
between the two in regard to board and
organizational outcomes. In addition, the paper
draws board chairs’ and board directors’ attention to
the importance of the selection and retention of
CEOs who are on good terms with both. Ignoring this
important factor when selecting CEOs has important
implications. Put differently, a narrow focus on CEO
competence in the selection process is not
an optimal strategy to pursue as a healthy
relationship between CEO and board members has
implications not only for the board itself but also for
firm performance.

Jacobs, 2014; Jehn & Bendersky, 2003; Hussein &
Al-Mamary, 2019; Higazee, 2015).
Relatedly, we focus on the CEO-board chair
conflict
irrespective
of
the
demographic
characteristics of this dyadic relationship. Theory
points to the importance of the surface- and deeplevel diversity composition of dyads in shaping
employee attitudes, behaviors, and organizational
outcomes (Liden, Anand, & Vidyarthi, 2016; Miller &
Triana, 2009). Although much is known about
the relationship
between
board
diversity
composition and organizational outcomes, such as
firm performance and strategic change (Miller &
Triana, 2009; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014),
future research should focus on how the CEO-board
chair diversity composition interacting with conflict
relates to outcomes.
In
addition,
scholars
have
examined
the relationship between conflict and cultural values.
For
example,
Koc
(2010)
theorized
about
the relationship between assertiveness, performance
orientation, and gender egalitarianism and conflict
resolution strategies for Turkey in the context of its
main trading partners. Kaushal and Kwantes (2006)
theorized and empirically found with a sample of
undergraduate students that vertical individualism
and vertical collectivism positively relate to
a dominating conflict resolution strategy. Research
is needed to understand how culture interacts with
conflict resolution strategies to explain dyadic and
organizational outcomes.
Furthermore,
the
manuscript
addresses
the dark side of the conflict, while future research
can widen the scope to explore the potential positive
side of the conflict between CEO-board chair on
board dynamics and organizational outcomes as
well as the effective methods in which the conflicts
can be handled by the board chair or CEO. A good
start of this stream can be found in the work of
Heemskerk et al. (2017) which differentiated
between low and high levels of relationship conflict
between the board chair and CEO. While low-level
relationship conflicts pointed to a well functioning
board, a high level of relationship conflict had
negative implications on board outcomes such as
board task performance. Future studies can inform
us further on the nuances and types of conflict that
can potentially occur between this dyad and can
discriminate between effective and ineffective
conflicts and their implications on board and
organizational outcomes.

4. CONCLUSION
In this study, we examined the CEO-board chair
conflict from
the perspective of resource
dependence
theory.
We
elaborated
on
the antecedents
of
this
conflict
and
its
consequences, and we detailed the conflict handling
techniques from the CEO’s side. Conflict has been
a topic that was awaiting closer examination,
especially
within
the
corporate
governance
phenomenon. This manuscript can lay the grounds
for future scholarly discussions that examine
the conflict
phenomenon
within
corporate
governance and that can point to further important
implications on firm performance as well as other
organizational, team, and individual-level outcomes.
In this study, we focused on the conflict
between the CEO and the chair of the board. Future
research can focus on other types of conflicts within
the boardroom and among the corporate governance
members of the organization and their implications
on individual-, team-, and organizational-level
outcomes. As we concede with Cascio (2004) that
the board
governance
resembles
workgroup
dynamics, we aspire to see future work that
particularly addresses the conflict between different
dyads and within the board’s workgroup as well as
research work that addresses the specific types and
levels of conflicts and their related consequences at
the corporate governance level (Horton, Bayerl, &
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